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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

E. HALVORSON, INC., and THE
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

Case No.

THEODORE L. WILLIAMS, and
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,
Defendants.

10743

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
Plaintiffs' petition for review of the Industrial
Commission's order requiring plaintiffs to pay the
entire amount awarded applicant for permanent total
disability under the Utah Workmen's Compensation
Act.

1

DISPOSITION BEFORE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
The applicant made claim for permanent total dis·
ability. The Industrial Commission heard evidence on
said claim. It awarded applicant the maximum amount
allowed for a permanent total disability and ordered
plaintiffs to pay the entire amount of the award.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendants submit the Order of the Commis·
sion should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Prior to October 13, 1964, the defendant, Theodore
L. Williams, worked regularly as a carpenter perform·
ing a variety of duties requiring "heavy" muscular
exertion ( T. 79). On that date, while employed by
E. Halvorson, Inc., a platform floor joist on which
he was standing tipped with him and he plummeted ,
approximately 20 feet to a cement apron. The impact
caused severe injury to both feet and lower back. He
was taken to a hospital by ambulance where x-rays
indicated the presence of bilateral severe oscalcis frac·
tures of both feet and a compression fracture of the
L-1 vertebra (T. 1, 43). Within the next two days.
Mr. Williams' condition deteriorated in a pronounced
manner delaying treatment of his fractures. His abdo·
men became distended, he suffered from shock, (T. 43i
2
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his blood pressure was very low, and he complained of
severe chest pains of a constricting nature radiating
into his back. The latter difficulty had not been experienced by the defendant either before or at the time of
his admission to the hospital (T. 52), and it was conduded that he had suffered from a coronary thrombosis sometime after his admission. Mr. Williams' condition was further complicated by a renal shutdown
followed by pneumonia.
Regarding his condition following the injury sustained on October 13, 1964, the medical panel stated:
In summary, Dr. Null concluded that Mr.
V\Tilliams had an acute coronary thrombosis and
myocardial infarction during hospitalization,
probably the evening of October 14 or the early
morning hours of October 15 with subsequent
arterial hypotension with resultant renal compromise attendant to the syndrome of lower
nephronephrosis; that he recovered from his episode of acute myocardial damage, associated
renal damage; that he also sustained a bout of
pneumonitis in the postoperative phase following repair of his ankles. After this period of
time, there does not appear to have been subsequent deterioration of his cardiac status, but he
does have anginal symptomatology on moderate
exercise, compromised by the fact that he has
chronic bronchitis and chronic, obstructive, pneumonary emphysema unrelated to his accident
... Dr. Null states that it is difficult to establish any causal relation between the ankle fractures and the heart-kidney-lung condition, but
that it is entirely possible that the trauma associated with the fall and ankle fractures did in-
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deed result in enough stress to induce the initial
cardiac episode and subsequent period of hypotension and renal compromise. ( T. 54, 55).
Dr. N ull's report to the panel further elicidated on
the causality of Mr. Williams' physical disabilities:
I am unable to state at this time if there is any
distinct cause of relationship between the fall
and the acute myocardial injury, however, it
would seem quite likely that the hypotensive epi·
sode subsequent to the myocardial injury was
related etiolologically to the renal compromise.
(T. 60) .

. . . he was found to have a severely low blood
pressure and electrocardiographic evidence of
a myocardial infarction . . . Following treat·
ment successfully for the hypotension, he went
into a period of renal shutdown with extreme
azotemia-kidney poisoning. This was treated
rather heroically with three peritoneal dialyses. ·
Following this, he went into a period of high
urine output requiring intravenous infusions.
Subsequent to this, he developed an anemia re·
quiring blood transfusions, and following this a
pneumonia. The Panel feels that all of these
events-disease.i;;-were causally related to the
accident ... he continues to have angina ... Suc!1
angina may reasonably be causally related to his
myocardial infarction. The Panel finds that .Mr.
Williams has severe, chronic pulmonary disease
which in itself would be sufficient reason for
total and permanent disability. (T. 41, 42).
It is to be noted that the medical panel's evaluation
of Mr. Williams was predicated on a complete report
from Dr. Null, for Dr. Vico, chairman of the panrl
4

had expressly requested that Dr. Null supply a "current evaluation of his present status, especially for
any residual of his serious medi~al illness while in the
hospital following his accident." (T. 33). The panel
complimented Dr. Null for the depth of his study and
tl1e "heroic treatment" administered to this "very sick
man" (T. 34).
The panel's report included the following characteriiation of Mr. Williams' hospital experience:
Prior to the panel study, the Commission had asked
for a report from the Medical Advisory Board, and a
preliminary finding came back indicating a "50% loss
of body function due to musculo-skeletal injuries" with
a request for further study of "cardiac and pulmonary
status and its relationship to accident" (T. 27).
After the panel report was in, the Medical Advisory Board submitted its final report which stated:
having completed its study and examination
. . . with respect to the measurement of permanent disp,bility caused by an accident arising out
of or in the course of his employment . . . (I)
Specific industrial disabilities chargeable to the
accident. Oct. 13, 1964. Perm. Total. (T. 70).
Thus the Medical Advisory Board found permanent
total disability caused by the accident. This report was
filed more than a month after plaintiff filed objections
lo the panel report. Plaintiff is silent throughout this
<'ase as to this most important report and finding.
Certain ambiguities in the panel report moved the
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plaintiffs to seek clarity, and this was provided in a
hearing before the Commission in which the panel report was elaborated upon and clarified by one of its
members, Dr. Crockett.
While it was known by the medical panel that Mr.
Williams had a pulmonary problem at the time of this
accident, it was apparently determined to be of minimal
significance in evaluating his accident derived disability,
for Dr. Crockett testified that Mr. Williams was "work·
ing and doing heavy duty work prior to his injury . . . so his pulmonary problem apparently was
not disabling" (T. 79). Further, that he "was suf·
ficiently able to carry on an occupation of reasonably
heavy work ... pulmonary wise and cardiac wise"
(T. 83); that Mr. Williams had "compensated priorto
the accident" ( T. 84). "His condition was some·
what stabilized ... it had apparently been reasonably
stable for several years . . . because he had been em·
ployed doing reasonably heavy work . . . but he
apparently had sufficient pulmonary reserve to do a
job" (T. 85, 86). (Emphasis added.)
The record is devoid of any showing that Mr. Wil·
Iiams was disabled or incapacitated prior to the accident
because of his pulmonary history. He had been treated
at the Veterans' Hospital before the accident, but con·
siderable of his previous medical history and records
had been before the panel, and Dr. Crockett, the testify·
ing member of the panel, said "I had no evidence for
disability prior to his injury" ( T. 88).
6
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This panel report and its studies were adopted by
the Commission upon its corrobation by Dr. Crockett.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN

RAT I N G APPLICANT PERMANENTLY
AND TOTALLY DISABLED BY REASON OF

THE ACCIDENT.

As stated in plaintiff's brief at page 6, there is no
dispute that Mr. Williams is 100% totally and permanently disabled. The question presented for review is
whether the evidence suports the Commission's finding
that defendant suffered a 100% disability as a consequence of hi.s accide,nt.
Plaintiffs contend that some undetermined percentage of Mr. Williams' present disability is attributable to a pre-existing condition; that being emphysema
and chronic bronchitis. It is the defendant's contention,
to the contrary, that since the evidence supports the
Commission's finding of 100% disability, which it attributed to the accident, an inquiry into the referenced pref'Xisting condition would be but an act of futility.
A review of the record and testimony supports the
contPntions of the defendants.
The Commission "initially" ref erred the case to a
Jle<lical Advisory Board, on Nov. 20, 1965. The exam7

mmg orthopedic doctors Beck, Rees and Holbrook
reported:
The board recommends ( 1) 50% loss of bodv
function .due to musculo-skeletal injuries; (2j
consultation by Dr. Null for evaluation of car·
diac and pulmonary status and its relationship to
accident. ( T. 27) .

Thereafter the file was forwarded to Dr. Viko for
study by himself, Dr. Crockett and R. Ershler as a
panel (T. 30). That panel requested Dr. Null to make
a further current study of the applicant with special .
interest on the causal relations to the accident (T. 33).

Applicant was then examined by Dr. Null, and
his extensive, careful reports of January 4, 1966, came
before the panel ( T. 35, 39). Based thereon, the panel
met with claimant, and thereafter the medical history
was carefully reviewed and summarized. The panel's '
report of January 18, 1966, fully documented and sum·
marized, was forwarded to the Commission consisting
of twenty pages (T. 41-60). Based on said documenta·
tion, the panel found: "that all of these events diseases - were causally related to the accident." It
then made its comments regarding the pulmonary prob·
lems prior to and after the accident almost as an after·
thought, using language that applicant's "pulmonar)·
disease in itself would be sufficient reason for total
and permanent disability" ( T. 42). The only percentile
reference is to "a 10-20% additional cause of disability"
for chronic cardiac disease as evidenced by angina. It
was this failure to specifically assess percentages that

8

caused plaintiffs to object to the panel report on February 18, 1966 (T. 66) wherein reference is made to the
initially found 50% loss of bodily function previously
assigned by the Medical Advisory Board for musculoskeletal disability. Plaintiffs asked that the percentage
for the other disabilities be made more specific ( T. 68) .
Thereafter, the Medical Advisory Board consisting
of Doctors Beck, Rees and Holbrook reassessed the
"Specific industrial disabilities chargeable to the accident of Oct. 13, 1964," and on March 26, 1966, entered
its conclusion with the abbreviation: "Perm. Total"
(T. 70). These latter specialists thus amplified their
earlier findings of 50 % musculo-skeletal loss of function
(T. 27) by entering a declaration of permanent total
disability "chargeable to the accident" ( T. 70). Thus
two boards - panels of specialists, internists and orthopedists - with vast experience concluded with considerable clarity that the injured man was permanently
and totally disabled by reason of the industrial accident.
To further clarify any existing ambiguities, a hearing was held June 16, 1966, at which time plaintiffs'
counsel obtained whatever clarification may have been
needed by cross-examining Dr. Crockett. He found
that the medical panel had meant that Mr. Williams
suffered a "100% disability as a result of the accident
and subsequent treatment" (T. 84). In no way did Dr.
Crockett change the panel report or its meaning; he
"iaiply clarified and corroborated it.
lt further appears, due to the manner m which
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plaintiffs' counsel put the initial question to Dr. Crockett
regarding musculo-skeletal problems and the subsequent
discussion, that plaintiffs' counsel erroneously assumed
that claimant suffered only a 50% musculo-skeletal
injury, for his inquiry was directed at the 50% disability
initially assigned by the orthopedic surgeons (T. 78).
Plaintiffs' brief makes no mention of the subsequent
finding of permanent total disability as found by the
Medical Advisory Board. It is important to an under·
standing of plaintiffs' objections to the panel report and
the award to realize that its counsel has always errone·
ously assumed only the 50% musculo-skeletal injury.
This figure came into the case while Dr. Martin, the at·
tending orthopedist was still treating claimant and
there are several ignored reports in the record after said
"initial" estimate. The final Medical Advisory Board report came in weeks after the panel report had been filed,
and after the initial objections of plaintiffs had been
made. Since these eminent orthopedists specifically
found all that was needed under Utah Code Ann.
35-1-69 ( 1966) to sustain an award of permanent total
disability caused by an accident arising out of and in
the course of employment, a determination of the per·
centage of pre-existing disability became irreleyant.
From an orthopedic standpoint alone, unrelated to
any pre-existing pulmonary condition, this board made
a sufficient final finding on which the award could be
predicated. However, the Commission went further
and requested a panel of internists to make a complete
study, and the results of this panel would of itself like·
10

wise sustain the award without reference to the orthopedic findings. When these two studies are put together
that the difficulties of percentiles amount to needless
further inquiry. Indeed, an inquiry into Mr. Willims' pre-existing condition would be a specious act,
so great was the traumatic effect of the injury and the
subsequent complications incident to treatment.
In Brown Terry & Woodruff v. Industrial
Comm'n, 78 Utah 15, 300 Pac. 945 (1931), the claimant
fell, struck his head on a cement pavement, suffered a
concussion, then a delayed cerebral hemorrhage, and was
unconscious for several days thereafter; he also lost onehalf the vision of his remaining eye, suffered pain in his
head, was nervous, irritable, and lost proper co-ordination between his mind and limbs. His award of total
permanent disability was contested in this court on
grounds that he had lost one eye some years before in
an accident, and the request was made, as in this case,
tu relieve the insurance carrier of part payment to be
made by the special fund by reason of such pre-existing
loss of one eye. This court refused to so do on a finding
there was no want of evidence to sustain the total award
on account of the fall.
In the case at bar, claimant's total impairment for
\1ork may be predicated on his musculo-skeletal perma11ent injuries, combined with the incidents of treatment
at the hospital, and their permanent total effect regardless of his pulmonary involvements as Dr. Null advised
the panel and Commission:
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The trauma associated with the fall and
ankle fractures did indeed result in enough stress
to induce the initial cardiac episode and subsequent period of hypotensions and renal compromise_ ... it ~ould seem quite likely that the hypotens1ve episode subsequent to the myocardial
injury was related etiologically to the renal compromise. ( T. 54, 55, 60).

With the clarifying testimony of Dr. Crockett that
claimant's pulmonary problem was not disabling (T.
79), that "he has 100% disability as a result of the
accident and subsequent treatment" (T. 83), and that
the pulmonary problem was "aggravated by his illness
and by the accident . . . made considerably worse by
the accident," the pre-existing condition is no more
relevant or material to the award than the lack of one
eye in the Brown case, supra. Indeed, in Marker v.
Industrial Comm'n, 84 Utah 587, 593, 37 P.2d 785, 788, •
( 1934), this court held that "where the subsequent
injury to a workman previously disabled, without com·
bining with a previous injury or condition, results in
total permanent disability, the employer is liable for the
whole award." (Emphasis added.) In the instant case,
it is by combining the minor pulmonary problem before
the accident with the terrifying results of the accident
that we get into peculiar percentiles in excess of 100%
which in the opinion of the defendants is unnecessary.
unwarranted, confusing, and ridiculous as to result.
So great was the injury and subsequent involvement.
panel inquiry into Mr. Williams' pre-existing condition
as provided for in Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-69 (1966).
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need not and, indeed, should not have application. There
is 100% disability clearly in the record without resort to
the antecedent, non-disabling conditions; the former
percentile being found first by the three internists, and
second, by the three orthopedists, to say nothing of the
findings of the surgeon, Dr. Martin who likewise reported:
He was last seen on IOI 4/ 65 and given a
100 % permanent disability from the type of work
he was capable of doing, this at the specific
request of the commission that he make an 'estimate of permanent disability.' (T. 24, 25, reverse
side).
An inquiry into the extent of any "previously incurred permanent incapacity" was and is unnecessary in
view of the testimony concerning the nature of the work
Mr. 'Villiams was performing and the "compensated,"
"stabilized" character of his physical condition at the
time of the accident. From a work standpoint, the record
is clear and undisputed, his prior condition was "not
disabling" ( T. 79). He may have been "rated" for a
pulmonary condition, but this was relevant only to military involvement and the rights incidental thereto, not
to industrial compensation.
l. Pre-e.xisting condition had stabilized, compen-

soted:

There is no dispute in the testimony and record
but that any pre-existing condition of Mr. Williams had
hee!l '·compensated" and was "stabilized.'' Certainly, he
had experienced pulmonary problems in the past, but
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on a most thorough study of specialists, "this man was
working and doing heavy-duty work prior to his injury. 1
So his pulmonary problem apparently was not di8•
ab ling" ( T. 79) . (Emphasis added.) "Prior to the
accident this man was working. He was sufficiently able
to carry on an occupation of reasonably heavy work;'
( T. 83) . His prior condition "had apparently been rea·
sonably stable for several years . . . doing reasonably
heavy work . . . apparently had sufficient pulmonary
reserve to do a job." ( T. 86). "This man was compensated prior to the accident (T. 84). (Emphasis ,
added.) Blakiston's New Gould Medical Dictionary
defines "compensation" to be: "The act of making
good a deficiency; the state of counter-balancing a
function or structural defect." President Eisenhower
and President Johnson (when he was senator) both
suffered a cardiac experience, and both are now "well ,
compensated" as is commonly known.
Plaintiff undertook in cross-examining Dr. Crock·
ett to relate the pre-existing condition to the defendant's
present disability, the doctor having said:
The pulmonary problem is not a result of the
accident. It was aggravated by his illness and
by the accident. In other words it was made con·
siderably worse by the accident. It's an aggra·
vation situation and not a cause.

Q. Prior to the accident, 100% pulmonary
disabled?
A. No, sir. Since the accident ... since the
accident he is 100</'o disabled pulmonary wise···

14
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He has 100% disability as a result of the accident
and subsequent treatment. (T. 83, 84).
As to the pre-existing condition, Dr. Crockett testified: "So his pulmonary problem apparently was not
disabling" ( T. 79) . (Emphasis added.)
2. Rating of Pre-existing Condition Not Nec-

essary:

Plaintiffs' whole case is predicated on the failure
of the Commission to assess "the percentage of permanent physical impairment attributable to previously
existing conditions whether due to accidental injury,
disease or congenital causes," as set forth in Utah Code
Ann. § 35-1-69 ( 1966) .
Plaintiffs' case fails because it ignores that the
panel report, the final Medical Advisory Board report,
and the clarifying testimony all of which predicate
total permanent disability on the accident and subsequent treatment (T. 41, 48). The effect of Dr.
Crockett's undisputed testimony is that the pre-existing condition is immaterial, so severe were the injury
and subsequent events occuring at the hospital. Pressed
by counsel to make an immaterial assessment under
the three criteria of Utah Code Ann.§ 35-1-69 (1966),
Dr. Crockett computed total percentages of disability
up to 170%, which created an absurd result. Under
no interpretation can the findings and conclusions of
the medical panel, adopted by the Co~ission, result
iu the defendant having less than 100% residual impairment resulting from the accident in the course
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of his employment. The Commission adopted and
found the 100% impairment directly as a result of
the fall and subsequent aggravation; and being thoroughly documented and undisputed from a medical
standpoint, the ultimate determination by the Commis·
sion should not be disturbed by this court. To attempt
to reduce the 100% by plaintiff's argument is to compel
resort to the immaterial semantics of discussing per·
centages in excess of 100 % . In terms of the facts estab·
lished above, the application of the law of this court
totally vindicates the award.
The panel, the board, Dr. Crockett and also the
Commission's ultimate findings are further corroborated by the finding and recommendation of Dr. A. F.
Martin, the orthopedist who did the surgery:
It is my feeling that he is 100% permanently
disabled for employment as to the type of work
he was, and is, capable of doing.
His additional problems of pulmonary insuf ·
ficiency with recurrent asthmatic attacks and
necessity of barbituate sedation is not directly
related to his industrial problems. (T. 21, 24.
25).

If, as a last resort, it is found necessary to apply Utah
Code Ann. § 35-1-69 ( 1966) , the provisions therein
first require the medical panel to determine the perma·
nent disability of the claimant. Upon finding the per·
centage of permanent disability they are next to de·
termine what percentage of this permanent disability
is attributable to the accident or an aggravation thereof.
Finally, they are to ascertain what percentage of saiil
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permanent disability is attributable to a pre-existing
incapacity. In the instant case, a determination was
made that the claimant was 1003 disabled. 503 of this
disability was initially found to be the direct result of
injury to his musculo-skeletal system sustained at the
time of the injury ( T. 27, 28). This preliminary finding
was later altered to amount in effect to 1003; but for
present purposes of argument, assume 503 musculoskeletal injury. An additional 10% to 20% disability
was attributed to a cardiac condition resulting from said
injury (T. 81, 42). In addition, the medical panel found
the claimant to be 1003 disabled by reason of a pulmonary condition (T. 42, 81, 82, 83). It is with regard to
the pulmonary disability that the present controversy
reposes. The medical panel for reasons of its own did
not see fit to ascertain the specific degree of pulmonary
disability that may have existed prior to the accident,
but Dr. Crockett testified such condition was compensated, not disabling ( T. 79, 84).
In view of the above statement of facts, the
following two lines of argument may be pursued.
a. Since the evidence sustains the finding that 1003
of the claimant's disability either resulted directly from
the accident or is attributable to an aggravation thereof, the panel would have been indulging in an act of
futility to have looked beyond the injury and its consequeuces in order to assess some hypothetical percentage for pre-existing incapacity.
h. 'Vhile the final report of the Medical Advisory
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Board holds total and permanent disability, for purposes
of argument, given only the preliminary 50% disabilit\'
attributed to musculo-skeletal difficulties, and a minimum of 10% attributable to the cardiac condition resulting from the accident, or an aggravation resulting therefrom, or aggravated thereby, the evidence need only
substantiate a 40% pulmonary disability attributable :
to the accident directly or by reason of aggravation iu
order to reach the requisite 100%. In view of the applicant's ability to perform heavy work on a full-time basis
prior to the accident, the fact that he was "compensated,''
that his condition had been "stable for several years,"
and that he "had sufficient pulmonary reserve to do a
job," it must be concluded in the light of the applicant's
present pulmonary condition that more than 40% of his
pulmonary disability is attributable to the accident and
subsequent hospitalization. Otherwise, he would hare ,
been suffering at least a 60% disability prior to the
accident, which his work record belies.
.1

1

If then, 40% of his pulmonary condition is related
directly to the accident or an aggravation resulting from
the vast complications of the infarction, low-blood pressure, renal shut-down, pneumonia, to say nothing of the
lumbar fracture, then the award of the Commission must
be sustained.
3. Deci.'lions Re the Special Fund:

Keeping in mind that Dr. Crockett's uncontradicted testimony stated applicant's prior "pulmonary
problem apparently was not disabling,'' Justice Follan(L
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writing for the court stated in Marker v. Industrial

Comm'n, 84 Utah 587, 593, 37 P.2d 785, 788 (1931):

This court has held that where the subsequent
injury to a workman previously disabled, without
combining with a previous injury or condition,
results in total permanent disability, the employer
is liable for the whole award. Standard Coal v.
Industrial Comm., 69 U 83, 252 P 292; Brown et
al v. Industrial Comm., 78U15, 300 P 945.
In the Standard Coal case cited above in Marker
this court held, 69 Utah at 90, 252, P2d at 294:
It must be admitted that at the time the applicant entered the employ of the Standard Coal
Company he was suffering bodily infirmities, such
infirmities as would render him more liable to
suffer injuries from an accident than if the prior
injuries had not occurred. There is, however, no
evidence that these infirmities ever incapacitated
him for work or that there had been any decrease
in wages by reason of his physical condition ....
That the employe had infirmities or diseases that
might and did render him more susceptible to
injury resulting from an accident does not relieve
the employer from the duty to pay such compensation. [Emphasis added.)
l i must be noted that substantially the same applicable
statutory enactment was operative in 1926, at the time
of' the Standard decision, as is now in effect, with the
llotahlc exception of the following instruction which re<;t1ircs the assessment of precentages for previously ine11rrrd permanent incapacity in Utah Code Ann. § 35HHJ ( 1966):
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but the liability of his employer shall be for
the latter injury only and the remainder shall be
paid out of the special fund.
Furthermore, as elaborated in the Standard Coal case
'
supra, 69 Utah at 11, 252 P.2d at 292:

It is no defense to a claim for compensation
that the injury lighted up, reopened, or revived
an existing infirmity of the injured employee
.... The principle or rule of law there announced
is supported by the great weight of authority,
if not by the unanimous opinion of the courts.
Our statutes prescribe no standard of health or
of physical condition to entitle one to the bene·
fits of the Compensation Act.
The remarkable pertinence of the Standard case to the
one at bar is the highlighting of the various pre-exist·
ing difficulties present in the Standard case which were
elaborated in the dissent, 69 Utah at 94, 252 P.2d at
297 (dissenting opinion) .
. . . a prior severe fracture and breaking of the
bones of the skull . . . the amputation of two
fingers and a part of the hand ... the shattering
of the hip bone ... [rendering] the leg consid·
erably shorter than the other; ... the breaking
of his ribs ... [and] hole torn in his side.
Yet, in the Standard case, this court affirmed the Com·
mission's finding that the aforementioned trauma did
not causally detract from the last injury for which the
applicant was given a total, permanent award.
The Panel and the Commission found in this case
that applicant's condition after the accident was reJnted
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to the fall and subsequent complications, which puts
the matter clearly within the doctrine of the Standard
Cual case, and makes it unnecessary and immaterial to
iuquire further into the Veterans Hospital history.1
POINT II
THE COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN
FAILING TO DETERMINE THE PERCENTAGE OF IMPAIRMENT DUE TO PRE-EXIST ING CONDITION.
As argued in Point I, the finding of the Panel and
the Commission is ~hat 100% of applicant's present
condition was and is due to the injury and subsequent
treatment complications. There was not a misapplication of law in that finding as argued by plaintiff.
Plaintiff objected to the panel report and asked
for a hearing which was had, resulting in the strong
corroboration by Dr. Crockett of the panel report. As
stated by plaintiff, this court will not disturb disputed
findings of fact, but will only review errors of law.
It is submitted the findings of fact are not in dispute.
The only error at law argued is the failure of the Commission to make a useless referral of the case back to
tbe panel for further inquiry into the Veterans Hospital
records in aid of attributing some percentage of disability to a pre-existing incapacity. The hearing was
l S0e also Brown Terry & \V(lodruff v. Industrial Comm'n, 300
Pac 945 (Utah 1931); In re Larson, 279 Pac. 1087 (Idaho 1929);
Hackford v. Industrial Comm'n, 380 P.2d 927 (Utah 1963).
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held for the purpose and had the effect of clarifyinu
any ambiguity in the panel report in this regard. Plain~
tiff asked "That the file be sent back to the panel, and
ask them to clarify that particular point."
Defendants submit that resort to "all medical
aspects," which counsel argues to mean further stud1
of Veterans' Administration files, is not required in tl;e
absence of clear evidence of a prior permanent injury
or disease which due to an accident results in perrna·
nent incapacity substantially greater than the applicant would have incurred if he had not had the pre·
existing incapacity.
Plaintiff wants further information as to the pre·
existing condition, but Dr. Crockett was satisfied with
the evidence in the record, leading him to say "I hail
no evidence for disability prior to his injury ... I kne11
that he had pulmonary emphysema and chronic brou·
chitis, due to his history. Due to the Veterans' Hos·
pital records" ( T. 88) . True those records were not
pursued, but in view of the satisfactory evidence befon
the panel that he had "compensated" and was do·
ing "heavy work" it is submitted that no further in·
quiry was necessary. There was sufficient factual in·
formation available to indicate that the pre-existing
condition was of such minor moment, in terms of the
serious injury and its results, as to make a specific
prior rating superfluous. The expert boards founil
100% permanent disability resulting directly from th{
accident. As stated earlier, it would not aid this CoJIJ
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mission nor this court to conjure with disability per~eutages in excess of 100%.

POINT III
ANY ERROR IN THE COMMISSION'S
HOLDING THAT UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-169 (1966) DOES NOT APPLY IS HARMLESS.
The fore-part of the order of the Commission is

not correct in finding:

The Motion to Dismiss and Objections are
apparently based on Section 35-1-69 UCA which
was substantially amended by the 1965 Legislature, effective July 1, 1965. The Section as
amended applies to injuries occurring after the
effective date of the am®ded Section. To hold
otherwise would be retroactive legislation and
therefore unconstitutional. (T. 92).
It could be that the Commission assumed that the
1963 amendments did not become law until 1965 in

which case its application would be retroactive if applied to this case,. But such error was harmless, and
the results are not changed as to this 1964 accident
because the panel report and Dr. Crockett's testimony
predicate 100% disability on the accident.
The conclusions of the Commission are correct
although some of the reasoning set forth in the order
JrP in error. However, it is the result reached, in terms
1Jf' tlie evidence, and not the reasons given that are to
br sustained here.
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POINT IV

THE COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IK 1
ADOPTING THE MEDICAL PANEL RE- I
PORT.

Point III of plaintiff's brief is somewhat mislead·
ing. While it is probably true that the Panel report 1
"was ambiguous and the same needed clarification hr,
the doctor's further testimony," the plaintiff's clau~
is entirely erroneous that "the testimony of Dr. Crock·
ett did not sustain the medical panel report."
The panel report states, after reviewing the in· ,
itial injury, that there was evidence of severe low blood
pressure, myocardial infarction, kidney poisoning, ane·
mia and then a pneumonia, and then adds: "The Panel
feels that all of these events-diseases-were causally
related to the accident" (T. 41, 42). The ambiguity '
occurs thereafter in comments on the pulmonary dis·
ease and complications. It is submitted that Dr. Crock·
ett clearly relieved the panel report of ambiguity an<l,
in no way did he disagree with nor negative the panel;
report, rather he sustained the findings of the panel in '
every particular. Confirmative of the panel, Dr. Crock·
ett testified that the applicant had "100% disability as
a result of the accident and subsequent treatment." Snh·
sequent to Dr. Crockett's testimony, counsel for the
applicant-defendant undertook to make sure that the
entire medical record was a part of the transcript l
which plaintiff did not object ( T. 88, 89). In view of
Dr. Crockett's corroboration of the medical panel re·
1

11
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port, the problems raised in Hackford v. Industrial
Comm'n, 11 Utah 2d 312, 358 P.2d 899 (1961), are
not pertinent. The medical reports, which are most complete, were properly adopted and they form a complete
reciprocal support for the testimony of Dr. Crockett.
Likewise they sustain the ultimate award of the Comffi1Ss10n.

CONCLUSION
The Commission did not err in its award of 100%
permanent, total disability, due to injury received in
an industrial accident while at work, for the plaintiff,
E. Halvorsen, Inc. The award is fully sustained by the
medical information, panel reports, and the testimony.
Respectfully submitted,
W. C. LAMOREAUX
415 South 2nd East
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Defendant
Theodore W. Williams
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Attorney General
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Industrial Commission of Utah
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